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THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE: 
CHRISTIANITY, CIVIL RELIGION, AND THE ENDURING 
CONTRIBUTION OF RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS
It is a rather daunting task to address the place of religion in American public life. 
The question is so rich, so complex, and often so divisive, even contentious. It 
brings together the two things that American folk wisdom teaches us, from a very 
early age, that we should not discuss in polite company: religion and politics.
And indeed, one widely held, and widely respected, view of the matter is that 
one should say as little as possible in public about either religion or politics. While 
there are times when this is good advice, and represents the acme of prudence, it 
will hardly do for us as a general principle. A form of “civility” that is achieved 
only by our remaining studiously silent about the things that matter to us most, and 
are most fundamental to the health of our civil society, is not really civility, but 
merely an uneasy and impoverished social peace. Nor is this the kind of society that 
the American Constitutional order envisioned. The first item in our Bill of Rights 
makes it clear that the Framers placed religion in a very high place—not only as the 
first and most fundamental of our freedoms, but as a mental and moral and social 
right whose “free exercise” we also are promised.
The question can be made a little more manageable, too, by our making 
some distinctions. One can, to begin with, talk about the “place” of religion either 
descriptively or prescriptively, as the place religion occupies or as the place it ought 
to occupy. The two are impossible to separate, of course, and I will do some linking 
of them in what follows. But the distinction is a useful one to make at the outset.
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Also, I have assumed in what follows that we are speaking of an American 
public square, although the title does not specify that. As you’ll see, I am a typical 
historian in regarding these questions as being highly context-sensitive in charac-
ter. I will have nothing to say about, for example, the issue of Turkish women being 
allowed to wear head coverings in public, or French women being proscribed from 
doing so. And I find it very difficult to talk about the particular texture of American 
religious life, and our view of religious liberty in this country, without taking into 
account certain highly particular aspects of American history and society.
Which brings one to a last distinction, revolving around the place of Chri-
stianity in one’s thinking. One can talk about the “place” of religion in American 
life from the standpoint of an American citizen, irrespective of one’s belief or unbe-
lief. Or one can talk about the place of religion in American life specifically from 
the standpoint of a Christian believer. The two are not necessarily the same. Nor 
are they necessarily at odds. And there is a wide variety of points of view within 
each perspective. But it is useful to think about them separately, and sometimes to 
employ different language to do so.
What I will do in what follows is to try, in a very rough way, to do first the 
one, then the other. I should like first to address myself in a general and detached 
way to the phenomenon of religion in public, using the concept of “civil religion” 
to illuminate the way. Then I will take a look at the latter, how to think Christianly 
about the role of one’s own faith in the public square, viewing the matter through 
a consideration of the career of the man who was mainly behind the emergence of 
the term “public square” in our discourse about these matters: the late Richard John 
Neuhaus. Then, finally, we can consider how the two different perspectives may 
combine, or clash.
***
I’ll begin by thinking back to the situation approximately nine years ago. In the im-
mediate wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Americans suddenly found themselves 
faced with an unexpected choice between radically different perspectives on the pro-
per place of religion in modern Western society. The alternative perspectives were 
not new. But the urgency with which they were felt, and the intensity with which they 
were articulated, marked a dramatic departure. Coming at a moment when Ameri-
cans had been gradually rethinking many settled precedents regarding religion and 
public life, it seemed to give a sharper edge to the questions being asked.
For many intelligent observers, there was only one logical conclusion to 
be drawn from these horrifyingly destructive acts, perpetrated by fanatically com-
mitted adherents to a militant and demanding form of Islam: that all religions, and 
particularly the great monotheisms, constitute an ever-present menace to the peace, 
order, and liberty of Western civil life. Far from embracing the then-growing senti-
ment that the United States government should be willing to grant religion a greater 
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role in public life, such observers took 9/11 as clear evidence of just how serious 
a mistake this would be. The events of 9/11 seemed to confirm their contention 
that religion is incorrigibly toxic, and that it breeds irrationality, demonization of 
others, irreconcilable division, and implacable conflict. If we learned nothing else 
from 9/11, in this view, we should at least have relearned the hard lessons that the 
West learned in its own bloody religious wars at the dawn of the modern age. The 
essential character of the modern West, and its greatest achievement, is its tolerant 
secularism. To settle for anything less is to court disaster. If there still has to be 
a vestigial presence of religion here and there in the world, let it be kept private and 
kept on a short leash. Is not Islamist terror the ultimate example of a “faith-based 
initiative”? How many more examples did we need?
To be sure, most of those who put forward this position were predisposed to 
do so. They found in 9/11 a pretext for restating settled views, rather than a catalyst 
for forming fresh ones. More importantly, though, theirs was far from being the 
only response to 9/11, and nowhere near being the dominant one. Many other Ame-
ricans had a completely opposite response, feeling that such a heinous and frighte-
ningly nihilistic act, so far beyond the usual psychological categories, could only 
be explained by resort to an older, pre-secular vocabulary, one that included the 
numinous concept of “evil.” There were earnest post 9/11 efforts, such as the phi-
losopher Susan Neiman’s thoughtful book Evil in Modern Thought, to appropriate 
the concept for secular use, independent of its religious roots.1 But such efforts 
have been largely unconvincing. If 9/11 was taken by some as an indictment of the 
religious mind’s fanatical tendencies, it was taken with equal justification by others 
as an illustration of the secular mind’s explanatory poverty. If there was incorrigible 
fault to be found, it was less in the structure of the world’s great monotheisms than 
in the labyrinth of the human heart—a fault about which those religions, particular-
ly Christianity, have always had a great deal to say.
Even among those willing to invoke the concept of evil in its proper religio-
us habitat, however, there was disagreement. A handful of prominent evangelical 
Christian leaders, notably Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, were unable to resist 
comparing the falling towers of lower Manhattan to the Biblical towers of Babel, 
and saw in the 9/11 attacks God’s judgment upon the moral and social evils of 
contemporary America, and the withdrawal of His favor and protection.2 In that 
sense, they were the mirror opposites of their foes, seizing on 9/11 as a pretext for 
re-proclaiming the toxicity of American secularism. They were arguing for a sepa-
ration of religious identity and national identity, from a position mainly concerned 
to preserve the integrity of religion.
1 S. Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy, Princeton 2002.
2 Falwell and Robertson made their statements on Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network television 
show, “The 700 Club,” on September 13, 2001. Their discussion was covered the following day by J. F. Harris of 
the “Washington Post” in “God Gave Us ‘What We Deserve’, Falwell Says,” p. C03, also found at www.washing-
tonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28620-2001Sep14.
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But their view was not typical, and in fact, was so widely regarded as rec-
kless and ill-considered. The more common public reaction was something much 
simpler and more primal. Millions of Americans went to church, searching there 
for reassurance, for comfort, for solace, for strength, and for some semblance of re-
demptive meaning in the act of sharing their grief and confusion in the presence of 
the transcendent. Both inside and outside the churches, in windows and on labels, 
American flags were suddenly everywhere in evidence, and the strains of “God 
Bless America” seemed everywhere to be wafting through the air, along with other 
patriotic songs that praised America while soliciting the blessings of the Deity. The 
pure secularists and the pure religionists were the exceptions in this phenomenon. 
For most Americans, it was unthinkable that the comforts of their religious heri-
tage and the well-being of their nation could be in any fundamental way at odds 
with one another. Hence it can be said that 9/11 produced a great revitalization, for 
a time, of the American civil religion, that strain of American piety that bestows 
many of the elements of religious sentiment and faith upon the fundamental politi-
cal and social institutions of the United States.
***
Such a tendency to conflate the realms of the religious and the political has hardly 
been unique to American life and history. Indeed, the achievement of a stable rela-
tionship between the two constitutes one of the perennial tasks of social existence. 
But in the West, the immense historical influence of Christianity has had a lot to 
say about the particular way the two have interacted over the centuries. From its 
inception, the Christian faith insisted upon separating the claims of Caesar and the 
claims of God—recognizing the legitimacy of both, though placing loyalty to God 
above loyalty to the state. The Christian was to be in the world but not of the world, 
living as a responsible and law-abiding citizen in the City of Man while reserving 
his ultimate loyalty for the City of God. Such a separation and hierarchy of loy-
alties, which sundered the unity that was characteristic of the classical world, had 
the effect of marking out a distinctively secular realm, although at the same time 
confining its claims.
For Americans, this dualism has often manifested itself as an even more 
decisive commitment to something called “the separation of Church and State,” 
a slogan that is taken by many to be the cardinal principle governing American po-
litics and religion.3 Yet the persistence of an energetic American civil religion, and 
of other instances in which the boundaries between the two becomes blurred, sug-
gests that the matter is not nearly so simple as that. There is, and always has been, 
considerable room in the American experiment for the conjunction of religion and 
state. This is a proposition that committed religious believers and committed secu-
larists alike find deeply worrisome—and understandably so, since it carries with it 
3 P. Hamburger, Separation of Church and State, Cambridge MA 2002.
219THE PLACE OF RELIGION...
the risk that each of the respective realms can be contaminated by the presence of 
its opposite number. But it is futile to imagine that the proper boundaries between 
religion and politics can be fixed once and for all, in all times and cultures, sepa-
rated by an abstract fiat. Instead, their relationship evolves out of a process of con-
stant negotiation and renegotiation, responsive to the changing needs of the culture 
and the moment. It is, to repeat the term I used before, highly context-sensitive.
Experience suggests, however, that we would be well advised to steer be-
tween two equally dangerous extremes, which can serve as negative landmarks in 
our deliberations about the proper relationship between American religion and the 
American nation-state. First, we should avoid total identification of the two, which 
would in practice likely mean the complete domination of one by the other— 
a theocratic or ideological totalitarianism in which religious believers completely 
subordinated themselves to the apparatus of the state, or vice versa. But second, 
and equally important, we should not aspire to a total segregation of the two, which 
would in practice bring about unhealthy estrangement between and among Ame-
ricans, leading in turn to extreme forms of sectarianism, otherworldliness, cultu-
ral separatism, and gnosticism, a state of affairs in which religious believers will 
regard the state with pure antagonism, or vice versa. Religion and the nation are 
inevitably entwined, and some degree of entwining is a good thing. After all, the 
self-regulative pluralism of American culture cannot work without the ballast of 
certain elements of deep commonality. But just how much, and when and why, are 
hard questions to answer categorically.
***
Let’s take a closer look at the concept of “civil religion.”4 This is admittedly very 
much a scholar’s term, rather than a term arising out of general parlance, and its 
use seems to be restricted mainly to anthropologists, sociologists, political scien-
tists, and historians and the like, even though it describes a phenomenon that has 
existed ever since the first organized human communities. It is also a somewhat 
imprecise term, which can mean several things at once. Civil religion is a means of 
investing a particular set of political/social arrangements with an aura of the sacred, 
thereby elevating their stature and enhancing their stability. It can serve as a point 
of reference for the shared faith of the entire state or nation, focusing on the most 
generalized and widely held beliefs about the history and destiny of that state or 
nation. As such, it provides much of the social glue that binds together a society 
through well-established symbols, rituals, celebrations, places, and values, supply-
ing the society with an overarching sense of spiritual unity—a sacred canopy, in 
4 An excellent introduction to current thinking on the subject is Civil Religion in Political Thought: 
Its Perennial Questions and Enduring Relevance in North America, ed. J. von Heyking, Washington 2010. 
Although the term “civil religion” generally traces back to Rousseau, its modern usage is grounded in the work 
of Emile Durkheim; see notably his Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. C. Cosman, New York 2001.
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Peter Berger’s words—and a focal point for shared memories of struggle and su-
rvival.5 It can sometimes take on some of the spontaneous characteristics of a folk 
religion, but it also can be highly artificial and self-consciously wrought. Although 
it borrows extensively from the society’s dominant religious tradition, it is not itself 
a highly particularized religion, but instead a somewhat more blandly inclusive 
one, into whose highly general stories and propositions those of various faiths can 
read and project what they wish. It is, so to speak, a highest common denominator.
The phenomenon of civil religion extends back at least to classical antiqu-
ity, to the local gods of the Greek city-state, the civil theology of Plato, and to the 
Romans’ state cult, which made the emperor into an object of worship himself. But 
the term itself appears in recognizably modern form in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
Social Contract, where it was put forward as a means of cementing the people’s 
allegiances to their polity.6 Rousseau recognized the historic role of religious sen-
timent in underwriting the legitimacy of regimes and strengthening citizen’s bonds 
to the state and their willingness to sacrifice for the general good. He deplored the 
influence of Christianity in this regard, however, precisely because of the way that 
it divided citizens’ loyalties, causing them to neglect worldly concerns in favor of 
spiritual ones. Christians made poor soldiers, because they were more willing to 
die than to fight.
Rousseau’s solution was the self-conscious replacement of Christianity with 
“a purely civil profession of faith, of which the Sovereign should fix the articles, 
not exactly as religious dogma, but as social sentiments without which a man can-
not be a good citizen and faithful subject.” Since it was impossible to have a co-
hesive civil government without some kind of religion, and since (as he believed) 
Christianity is inherently counterproductive to or subversive of sound civil govern-
ment, he thought the state should impose its own custom-tailored religion, which 
provides a frankly utilitarian function. That civil religion should be kept as simple 
as possible, with only a few, mainly positive beliefs: the existence and power of 
God, the afterlife, the reality of reward or punishment, etc., and only one negative 
dogma, the proscribing of intolerance. Citizens would still be permitted to have 
their own peculiar beliefs regarding metaphysical things, so long as such opinions 
were of no worldly consequence. But “whosoever dares to say, ‘Outside the Church 
no salvation,’” Rousseau sternly declared, “ought to be driven from the State.”
Needless to say, such a nakedly manipulative approach to the problem of 
socially binding beliefs, and such dismissiveness toward the commanding truths of 
Christianity and other older faiths,  has not attracted universal approval, in Rousse-
au’s day or since. Nor has the general conception of civil religion. It is not hard to 
see why. One of the most powerful and enduring critiques came some two centuries 
later, from the pen of the American scholar Will Herberg, whose classic 1955 study 
Protestant Catholic Jew concluded with a searing indictment of what he called 
5 P. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Toward a Sociological Theory of Religion, Garden City 1967.
6 J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, transl. C. Betts, New York 2009, p. 158–168.
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the “civic” religion of “Americanism.” Such religion had lost every smidgen of its 
prophetic edge; instead, it had become “the sanctification of the society and cultu-
re of which it is the reflection.” The Jewish and Christian traditions had “always 
regarded such religion as incurable idolatrous,” because it “validates culture and 
society, without in any sense bringing them under judgment.” Such religion no 
longer comes to prod the indolent, afflict the comfortable, and hold the mirror up to 
our sinful and corrupt ways. Instead, it “comes to serve as a spiritual reinforcement 
of national self-righteousness.” It was the handmaiden of national arrogance and 
moral complacency.7
But civil religion also had its defenders. One of them, the sociologist Robert 
N. Bellah, put the term on the intellectual map, arguing in an influential 1967 ar-
ticle called “Civil Religion in America” that the complaint of Herberg and others 
about this generalized and self-celebratory religion of The American Way of Life 
was not the whole story.8 The American civil religion was, he asserted, something 
far deeper and more worthy of respectful study, a body of symbols and beliefs 
that was not merely a watered down Christianity, but possessed a “seriousness and 
integrity” of its own. Beginning with an examination of references to God in John 
F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address, Bellah detected in the American civil-religious 
tradition a durable and morally challenging theme: “the obligation, both collective 
and individual, to carry out God’s will on earth.” Hence Bellah took a much more 
positive view of that tradition, though not denying its potential pitfalls. Against 
the critics, he argued that “the civil religion at its best is a genuine apprehension 
of universal and transcendent religious reality as seen in or ... revealed through the 
experience of the American people.” It provides a higher standard against which 
the nation could be held accountable.
***
For Bellah and others, the deepest source of the American civil religion is the Puri-
tan-derived notion of America as a New Israel, a covenanted people with a divine 
mandate to restore the purity of early apostolic church, and thus serve as a godly 
model for the restoration of the world. John Winthrop’s famous 1630 sermon to 
his fellow settlers of Massachusetts Bay, in which he envisioned their “plantation” 
as “city upon a hill,” is the locus classicus for this idea of American chosenness. 
It was only natural that inhabitants with such a strong sense of historical destiny 
would eventually come to see themselves, and their nation, as collective bearers of 
a world-historical mission. What is more surprising, however, was how persistent 
that self-understanding of America as the Redeemer Nation would prove to be, and 
how easily it incorporated the secular ideas of the Declaration of Independence 
7 W. Herberg, Protestant Catholic Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology, Garden City 1960, 
p. 254–272.
8 R. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, “Dædalus” 1967, Vol. 96, No. 1 (Winter), p. 1–21.
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and the language of liberty into its portfolio. The same mix of convictions can be 
found animating the rhetoric of the American Revolution, the vision of Manifest 
Destiny, the crusading sentiments of antebellum abolitionists, the benevolent im-
perialism of fin-de-siècle apostles of Christian civilization, and the fervent idealism 
of President Woodrow Wilson at the time of the First World War. No one expressed 
the idea more directly, however, than Senator Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana, who 
told the United States Senate, in the wake of the Spanish-American War, that “God 
has marked us as His chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the 
world.”9
The American civil religion also has its sacred scriptures, such as the May-
flower Compact, the Declaration, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Gettys-
burg Address, the Pledge of Allegiance. It has its great narratives of struggle, from 
the suffering of George Washington’s troops at Valley Forge to the gritty valor of 
Jeremiah Denton in Hanoi, to the tangled wreckage of Ground Zero. It has its spe-
cial ceremonial and memorial occasions, such as the Fourth of July, Veterans Day, 
Memorial Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Martin Luther King Day. It has its temples 
and shrines and holy sites, such as the Lincoln Memorial and other monuments, 
the National Mall, the Capitol, the White House, Arlington National Cemetery, the 
great Civil War battlefields, and great natural landmarks such as the Grand Canyon. 
It has its sacred objects, notably the national flag. It has its organizations, such as 
the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, the Daughters of the American 
Revolution, and the Boy Scouts. And it has its dramatis personae, chief among 
them being its military heroes and the long succession of Presidents. Its telltale 
marks can be found in the frequent resort to the imagery of the Bible and reference 
to God and Providence in speeches and public documents, and in the inclusion of 
God’s name in the national motto (“In God We Trust”), on all currency, in the pa-
triotic songs found in most church hymnals.
The references to God have always been nonspecific, however. From the 
very beginnings of the nation’s history, the nation’s civil-religious discourse was 
carefully calibrated to provide a meeting ground for both the Christian and Enligh-
tenment elements in the thought of the Revolutionary generation. One can see this 
nonspecificity, for example, in the many references to the Deity in the presidential 
oratory of George Washington, which are still cited approvingly today as civil-
religious texts. But there is no denying that civil-religious references to God have 
evolved and broadened even further since the Founding, from generic Protestant to 
Protestant-Catholic to Judeo-Christian to, in much of President George W. Bush’s 
rhetoric, Abrahamic and even monotheistic in general. But what has not changed is 
the fact that such references still always convey a strong sense of God’s providen-
ce, His blessing on the land, and of the Nation’s consequent responsibility to serve 
as a light unto the nations.
9 A. Beveridge, In Support of an American Empire, a speech delivered to U.S. Senate on January 9, 
1900, which can be found at Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st Session, Vol. 33, p. 705, 711.
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Every President feels obliged to embrace these sentiments and expresses 
them in oratory. Some are more enthusiastic than others. Yet it is clear, given the 
force-field of tensions within which civil religion exists, that it has an inherently 
problematic relationship to the Christian faith, or to any other serious religious 
tradition. At its best, it provides a secular grounding for that faith, one that makes 
political institutions more responsive to calls for self-examination and repentance, 
as well as exertion and sacrifice for the common good. At its worst, it can provide 
divine warrant to unscrupulous acts, cheapen religious language, turn clergy into 
robed flunkies of the state and the culture, and bring the simulacrum of religious 
awe into places where it doesn’t belong.
***
Even today, over nine years after the attacks, a substantial flow of visitors continues 
to make pilgrimages to the former World Trade Center site in lower Manhattan. It 
remains an intensely moving experience, even with all the wreckage cleared away 
and countless pieces of residual evidence removed or cleaned up. One still enco-
unters open and intense expressions of grief and rage and incomprehension, in the 
other visitors and perhaps in oneself. It has become a shrine, a holy place, and has 
thereby become assimilated into the American civil religion, which is one reason 
why the controversy over the building of a large mosque in the immediate vicinity 
has been so heated. Yet for five years the site’s single most moving sight, its most 
powerful and immediately understandable symbol, was the famous cross-shaped 
girders that were pulled out of the wreckage, and raised as a cross. (The so-called 
Ground Zero Cross was moved in 2006 from the WTC site to St. Peter’s Church, 
which is directly across the street, and is to be returned to the site when a planned 
WTC museum is constructed there.)
What, one wonders, did that cross mean to the people viewing it, many of 
whom were not Christians and not even Americans? Was it a piece of nationalist 
kitsch, or a sentimental relic? Or was it a powerful witness to the redemptive value 
of suffering—and thereby, a signpost pointing toward the core of the Christian 
story? Or did it subordinate the core of the Christian story to a more generic reli-
gious meaning, one that in some sense traduced its Christian meaning? Or, most 
important for our purposes, did it subordinate the core of the Christian story to the 
American one, and thus traduce its Christian meaning?
***
In addressing ourselves to such questions today, it is nearly inevitable that we have 
recourse to the ideas and terminology of Richard John Neuhaus, especially as 
expressed in his 1984 book The Naked Public Square—one of the most significant 
books published in the United States during the past thirty years, and a book whose 
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momentum is far from being spent.10 That does not mean, however, that it has al-
ways been adequately understood. When a book achieves the influence and visibili-
ty of The Naked Public Square, and especially when its marvelously evocative title 
has become shorthand in the discourse of most educated people, it is likely to face 
certain problems in this regard. These may look like “nice problems to have,” but 
that does not mean they aren’t genuine problems. Often such books become fixed 
in the public mind in their most stereotypical or capsulized form, associated with 
arguments or perspectives that are but a poor reflection at best of what the books 
actually argue, and influencing public opinion in ways that their authors never quite 
intended.
Having a memorably evocative title is an especially mixed blessing, since it 
can too easily become a way of compressing a complex argument into a oversim-
plifying sound bite. This is good for notoriety but bad for understanding. The next 
thing you know, your argument is being passed around far and wide, but sealed 
inside the potent simplification, like a celebrity who is condemned to live trapped 
inside the artificial bubble of his fame.
All which is a way of making the point that those of us who actually read The 
Naked Public Square often find it is not the book that we think we “know about.” 
It is a far richer, subtler, more nuanced work, at once more bold and more tentative 
than its now-familiar tagline can convey, a book defying easy summation, with 
no easy party-line reassurances to offer any of the combatants in our culture wars. 
Its perspective is lofty and its intellectual reach embraces almost every significant 
theological or political issue relating to the relationship between church and state 
over the past 2,000 years. As a consequence, it often operates on a very high level 
of abstraction. And yet it also crackles with insight into the nitty-gritty particulars 
of American politics and culture. Its wide scope reach did not come at the expense 
of a secure grounding in the specificities of time and place.
It was not, to begin with, a simple critique of secularism per se. Neuhaus’s 
arc of reconsideration was longer and more complex than that. For him, the task at 
hand was not the dethronement of science or the overturning of the Enlightenment, 
let alone the political defeat of garden-variety American liberalism per se. Instead, 
the goal was and is the decoupling of liberal democracy from the iron logic of se-
cularization, and the recovery of an insight that, he argued, was apparent to most 
of the Founders of the American republic, but which liberal political philosophers 
and theologians have tended to bury and secular Europe has lost—that the health of 
democratic institutions depends as much on the free and vibrant public presence of 
the biblical religions, and their culture-forming influence, as it does on the constra-
ints placed on that religion’s ability to exercise direct political power.
A right understanding of Neuhaus’s argument needs to balance both sides of 
this formulation. In other words, he argued, our choices should not be restricted—
and in the end cannot be restricted—to either the complete privatization of religion 
10 R. J. Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America, Grand Rapids 1984.
225THE PLACE OF RELIGION...
or the complete integration of church and state. The separation of church and state 
is not, and cannot be, absolute, and it does not—and cannot—require the segrega-
tion of religion from public life. This is a complicated argument, and its working-
out in public policy is bound to be complicated too. But it is a direct challenge to 
the idea that a commitment to official secularism as national policy is the logical, 
nay inevitable, consequence of our commitment to liberal democracy. That, I belie-
ve, is the key thrust of this book, and it stands as much in need of explanation and 
articulation today as it did twenty-six years ago.
But the book does something more. The Naked Public Square argues that 
liberal democracy is inconceivable and unsustainable without a prior commitment 
to a certain conception of the human person—a belief that men and women are 
created in the image of God, that their dignity and their rights arise out of this 
condition, as endowments from their Creator, and therefore are not to be conferred 
upon them, or taken from them, by the state or by anything or anyone else, inclu-
ding themselves. I don’t think there is any way of getting round the fact that this is 
a fundamentally religious assertion. But it is an assertion to whose consequences 
many secularists would readily assent, circa 1984, since it undergirds the notions of 
universal human rights and human dignity that they, too, cherish. One can agree to 
disagree about the metaphysics, so long as the physics work out right.
But much has changed in twenty-five years. We now find ourselves in an 
era in which the process of manufacturing human beings strictly for medical and 
quasi-medical uses is no longer a futuristic pipedream but an activity that our major 
universities are eager to associate themselves with, and in which the concept of 
“transhumanity” is now being raised as a topic for serious discussion. It may be that 
the common ground is rapidly eroding. Why indeed, unless we have some religious 
reason for doing so, should we accept the notion of inherent human dignity, let alo-
ne human rights and human equality? Why should we continue to accept the notion 
of inherent human limitations, such as the inevitability of death and debility, and 
forgo the enhancements of strength, agility, intelligence, sexual prowess, and other 
characteristics that might be entailed in comprehensively remaking ourselves as in-
dividuals, or even as a species? And who is to decide when a blob of protoplasm is 
to be considered a person, and when it is to be deemed a mere blob of protoplasm? 
Can “public reason” provide a resolution of these matters, without making invo-
king—or negating—specifically religious assertions?
There is real reason to doubt whether it can do that. And this may help expla-
in why, in moving from The Naked Public Square to what would be his final book, 
Neuhaus seems to have moved past the deployment of secular ideas, and begins to 
place the American story in a more Biblical context. The change was striking.
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***
To begin with, we are talking about a book called American Babylon.11 And its 
subtitle is Notes of a Christian Exile. But what did these things mean? “Are we in 
Babylon?” Neuhaus asked. “Are we in exile?” The answer, it turns out, is yes and 
no. No, America is not the Babylon of the world’s nations. Indeed America still is 
for him, with all its decadence and disorder, a very great and exceptional nation, the 
source and bulwark of much that is good in the world, a nation whose story is “part 
of the story of the world,” a world that is, for all its fallenness, worthy of our love 
and allegiance.12 Neuhaus loved Lincoln’s formulation, that America was an “almo-
st-chosen” nation, a formulation that satisfied him far more than it satisfies me. But 
he liked it because it conveyed how there is much to support the idea that America 
has a special role to play in history, but that it is not the Biblical Israel, and certainly 
not the New Jerusalem.
In this sense, Neuhaus would say that yes, America Babylon is Babylon in the 
sense that all the world is Babylon. Or in Neuhaus’s own words:
America is Babylon not by comparison with other societies but by comparison with that radi-
cally new order sought by all who know love’s grief in refusing to settle for a community of less than 
truth and justice uncompromised.13
To make sense of such a situation, one can no longer look to secular social 
science, which knows nothing about what it means to dwell in the living reality of 
the not-yet. It cannot explain what Neuhaus declares to be his fundamental purpose 
in writing American Babylon: “to depict a way of being in a world that is not yet 
the world for which we hope….exploring the possibilities and temptations one con-
fronts as a citizen of a country that is prone to mistaking itself for the destination.”14 
Instead, he urges that we look to the prophetic counsel that the prophet Jeremiah 
related to the exiles living in the original Babylon:
Build houses and live in them; plant gardens and eat their produce. Take wives and have sons 
and daughters; take wives for your sons, and give your daughters in marriage, that they may bear sons 
and daughters; multiply there, and do not decrease. But seek the welfare of the city where I have sent 
you into exile, and pray to the Lord on its behalf, for in its welfare you will find your welfare.15
If we understand it rightly, the promise of what is to be, the world to come, 
only intensifies our commitment to the earthly city. We are to serve it faithfully and 
effectively. Yet, as in the story of the Biblical Daniel, himself an exile in Babylon, 
11 R. J. Neuhaus, American Babylon: Notes of a Christian Exile, New York 2009.
12 Ibidem, p. 30.
13 Ibidem, p. 2.
14 Ibidem, p. 3.
15 Ibidem, p. 15–16.
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we can be faithful and effective servants only up to a point, the point where our 
worship is being corrupted or misdirected and we are commanded to serve false 
gods. Then a parting of ways, perhaps even eventuating in the fiery furnace, is our 
only choice. But the story of Daniel just as clearly teaches that one does not dec-
lare such things lightly, and one must be willing to go a very long way in patience 
before making that choice. For those whose primary allegiance is to the City of 
God, every foreign country is a homeland, and every homeland is a foreign coun-
try. America is our homeland, and, as the prophet Jeremiah says, its welfare is our 
welfare. America is also—and history testifies that this is too easily forgotten— 
a foreign country. Like every political configuration of the earthly city, American 
too is Babylon. And so as Christians we too must learn to live here, and to sing, as 
in Psalm 137, the songs of Zion in a foreign land—and not make the mistake of 
thinking that the civil-religious songs are interchangeable with those songs.16
So what Neuhaus is balancing is an intense love of America with an intense 
awareness of America’s inadequacies, both general and specific. He expressed the 
love once in a famous sentence: “When I meet God, I expect to meet him as an 
American.”17 In so speaking, and as a Canadian-born naturalized American, he was 
not being a jingo, but instead insisting upon the scandal of particularity, that what 
we are is inseparable from the very particular things that comprise our earthly iden-
tities. Indeed, Neuhaus severely faults the American tendency, which he ultimately 
traces to Protestantism, toward a Gnostic abstractionism, the presumption that one 
can escape one’s time and place, including one’s identity as an American. But he 
insists upon the importance of the place of the American experiment, as he liked 
to call it, in establishing an earthly realm in which the idea that we are creatures 
of God with inalienable rights with which we are endowed by our Creator. Thus is 
America an exceptional nation in the story of the world.
The general inadequacy of America is that inadequacy shared by all earthly nations: they are 
Babylon, every one of them, and are not, and cannot be, transformed into the City of God. In this 
respect, America is no worse and no better.18
But he acknowledges that there is a specific inadequacy of America, one 
peculiar to its makeup and history, and related to its prominence in the story of the 
world. It has to do with its tendency to exaggerate America’s very real virtues, and 
its place within the story, and mistake its provisional goods for real and enduring 
ones, errors that lead America to the very grave error of “mistaking itself for the 
destination,” for the world for which we hope, rather than the Babylon for whose 
welfare we strive but in whose ultimate perfectibility we fervently disbelieve.19 
16 Ibidem, p. 26.
17 Ibidem, p. 27–28, 55.
18 Ibidem, p. 5.
19 Ibidem, p. 3.
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This is a version of what Reinhold Niebuhr called “the irony of American history,” 
by which he meant the way in which the country’s genuine virtues were precisely 
the source of its genuine vices.
One final observation that stems from this, and suggests something very im-
portant that we as Christians, and particularly those of us who are Protestant Chri-
stians, can take away from this discussion. Neuhaus makes the shrewd observation 
in American Babylon that our tendency as Americans to confuse Washington with 
Zion may have something to do with the way that Christianity has been conceived 
and institutionalized here. “American theology,” he says, “has suffered from an ec-
clesiological deficit, leading to an ecclesiological substitution of America for the 
Church through time.”20 That this would coexist with our Emersonian penchant for 
free-floating individualism is no paradox, but quite logical and consistent. That this 
would tend to support a disproportionately large role for the American civil religion 
seems almost inevitable.
I think Neuhaus had hold of something profoundly important here, one of the 
central riddles of Christianity in America. It is certainly the case that the American 
Protestant tradition, particularly in its evangelical form, suffers from a perilously 
weak ecclesiology, and has since the days of the Great Awakening. The energy of 
revivalism, a source of so much of its strength, is also a source of its vulnerability. 
Nothing has more severely impaired the Church’s ability to be a “people” apart from 
the culture in America, and thereby serve as a sign of contradiction and a signpost 
to Zion, than its inability to function as a cohesive institutional entity. When faith 
becomes radically individualized, it becomes far less culturally effectual, and ceases 
to be fully reflective of the Gospel in its wholeness and power.
And by the same token, a strengthened Church would give moral strength to 
the nation, precisely by counteracting its Babylonian tendencies and reminding it of 
its first principles. It should be able to speak those concerns in a way that respects 
the manner of discourse appropriate to the public square. But it should be able to 
speak those concerns openly and boldly rather than remaining silent about them.
It should be able to do so for two reasons. First, as a matter of freedom: be-
cause the genius of American pluralism at its best is expressed in the fact that, to 
very large extent, our deepest particular loyalties and our larger national loyalties 
are not viewed as mutually exclusive. Second, as a matter of virtue: because we 
serve the goal of responsible citizenship best by visibly upholding the principle that 
there are things higher and more important than merely being a citizen.
None of which means, however, that negotiating the twists, turns, and para-
doxes of a faithful Christian life will ever be easy, or ever be reducible to a formula. 
The place of religion in the contemporary American public square will continue to be 
a vital but contested one, constantly under negotiation and re-negotiation, constantly 
shifting ground, rethinking precedents, and incorporating new and changing realities. 
It seems unlikely to go away any time soon.
20 Ibidem, p. 41.
